This paper combines qualitative information from the Eurosystem Bank Lending Survey with micro-data on loan quantities and prices for the participating Italian banks to assess the role of supply and demand factors in credit developments, with a focus on the 2007-09 financial crisis. Both demand and supply have played a relevant role, especially for lending to enterprises, in the whole sample period and during the crisis. A counterfactual exercise shows that the effect of supply factors on the growth of lending to firms was strongest after the Lehman collapse. On average, over the crisis period the negative effect on the annualized quarter-on-quarter growth rate of the panel banks' lending to enterprises can be estimated in a range of 2.2 to 3.1 percentage points, depending on the specification. About one fourth of the total supply effect can be attributed to costs related to the banks' balance sheet position, the rest to their perception of credit risk.
Introduction 1
The sharp slowdown in bank lending between 2008 and 2009 in the major developed countries, including Italy, raises important questions. To what extent was it the result of macroeconomic forces and their effects on credit demand by firms and households, or instead of a tightening of banks' credit supply standards? If a significant supply restraint did occur, did it take place through price changes or through non-price rationing? And was it related mainly to credit risk developments or to changes in banks' balance sheet conditions and to their difficulties in raising funds in the market?
All of these questions are related to a more general issue that, though the object of a large body of research, remains far from settled, namely how to disentangle supply and demand effects on credit developments, given that the latter always reflect the combination of these two forces. This is a crucial issue for policymakers, as changes in credit dynamicsespecially when they are exceptional, as in the period considered -can have different effects on economic activity and require different monetary policy responses depending on whether they originate from demand or supply shocks. 2 However, disentangling the contribution of supply and demand factors using "hard data" on loans and other macro-variables is difficult. Changes in both prices and quantities reflect shifts in credit demand and supply curves, which in turn are potentially affected by business cycle fluctuations and changes in the monetary policy stance (see Bernanke and Gertler 1995 , Kiyotaki and Moore 1997 , and Bernanke et al. 1996 . This paper assesses the relative role of supply and demand factors in shaping credit developments in Italy, with a focus on the sharp slowdown of . It also examines, for the entire sample period and specifically for the crisis period, the role of the various factors behind changes in credit standards, distinguishing between factors relating to the cost of 1 We thank Ugo Albertazzi, Paolo Angelini, Daniel Dichter, Eugenio Gaiotti, Hannah Sabine Hempell, Angela Maddaloni, Domenico Marchetti, Fabio Panetta, José-Luis Peydró, Carlotta Rossi, Federico Signoretti, Stefano Siviero, Eliana Viviano and other participants in seminars at the Bank of Italy and the European Central Bank for useful comments and discussions. The views expressed in this paper are ours alone and do not necessarily reflect those of the Bank of Italy.
2 Reinhart and Rogoff (2008, 2009) compare major post-World War II episodes in the developed world and find that the aftermath of banking crises is typically characterized by a sharp fall in output and employment and a dramatic increase in the real value of government debt. The analysis carried out by the IMF (2009) also suggests that recessions associated with financial crises have been historically more severe and protracted than other recessions. Bassanetti et al. (2009) show that all of the most severe recessions in Italy since 1970 were associated with a sharp slowdown in credit to the private sector and a tightening of supply conditions. 6 funds and balance sheet constraints on the one hand and factors connected to borrowers' creditworthiness and banks' risk perception on the other. 3 The analysis has been carried out by combining qualitative information from the Eurosystem Bank Lending Survey (BLS) -the quarterly survey on credit conditions carried out since the end of 2002 in all countries of the euro area-with micro-data on loan quantities and prices for the Italian banks participating in the survey. 4 We use each bank's survey responses on loan supply and demand conditions (though with no disclosure of individual answers) together with data on its lending during the sample period to non-financial firms and to households for house purchases, and on the respective individual loan interest rates.
This approach differentiates our paper from previous studies based on the BLS or other lending surveys, all of which use aggregate data both for survey information and for credit developments.
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For the euro area, de Bondt et al. (2010) carry out a country-panel analysis, showing that the BLS responses on supply standards and demand help explain the growth in bank loans to enterprises, as well as real GDP growth and non-residential investment growth. Hempell and Kok Sorensen (2009) use the same methodology and data to carry out an analysis that focuses on the crisis period and also examines the relative importance of the various factors behind supply restraints. Maddaloni, Peydró and Scopel (2009) focus on the effects of monetary policy on credit standards. Ciccarelli, Maddaloni and Peydró (2009) assess, inter alia, the effects on economic activity of credit supply and demand shocks as captured by the BLS indicators.
For the United States, Lown, Morgan and Rohatgi (2000) and Morgan (2002, 2006) , using macro-data from the Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey of Bank Lending Practices (carried out by the Federal Reserve System since 1967), show that 3 Related evidence is provided by Panetta and Signoretti (2010) , who present a broad discussion of the relative role of supply and demand factors in credit developments in Italy during the crisis, and Caivano, Rodano and Siviero (2010) and Gaiotti (2010) , who estimate the impact of credit supply factors on firms' investment decisions and economic growth in Italy, also focusing on the crisis period. 4 The survey includes questions on lending standards, loan demand, specific terms and conditions in the provision of loans (such as price and non-price supply conditions), and factors driving loan supply and demand. The results are published regularly by the European Central Bank (ECB) for the euro area as a whole and by the Eurosystem national central banks for the respective countries. A detailed description of the survey can be found in Berg et al. (2005) .7 changes in credit supply standards help to predict loan growth and economic activity, and that a sharp tightening of credit standards has preceded virtually all economic recessions.
As an alternative to the use of a cross-country panel, our approach also allows us to enlarge the number of observations and circumvent the limits deriving from the shortness of the BLS sample period. Moreover, it has another important advantage in that loan developments and survey responses relate to the same panel of banks, while all other studies consider, in various ways, the relationship between the survey responses of a panel of banks and credit developments for the entire banking system. Although national panels in the BLS or in other surveys are designed to be representative of the respective national systems, the correspondence is inevitably approximate, which can potentially affect the results. In the case of Italy, the panel of banks participating in the BLS is quite large, as it corresponds to more than 60 per cent of the total system in terms of outstanding loans to enterprises and to households for house purchases; however, it is mostly representative of large banks, and lending developments for these banks do not necessarily coincide with those for the entire Italian banking system. During the financial crisis, in particular, the slowdown in lending was sharper for these banks than for smaller banks. This suggests that we can obtain more reliable results by using lending data for the same panel of banks that participate in the BLS.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data and presents descriptive evidence. Section 3 illustrates the main findings for both lending to enterprises and to households for house purchases. The subsequent three sections focus on lending to enterprises, in the light of their sharper deceleration during the financial crisis and their stronger estimated relationship with the BLS indicators. Specifically, Section 4 examines the relative importance of the different factors involved in the changes of credit standards.
Section 5 conducts a counterfactual exercise to assess the relative importance of demand and supply determinants during the financial crisis, and of "pure supply" vs. "perception of risk" determinants. Section 6 presents a robustness check on the relationship between loan growth and BLS information and its possible interpretative implications. Section 7 concludes.
BLS indicators and credit developments in Italy: data and descriptive evidence
This section provides information on the data used in the paper and some descriptive statistics.
The study is carried out on data for the panel of Italian banking groups (henceforth "banks") participating in the BLS, which are among the largest in the country. The effects of 8 mergers, which over time had tended to reduce their number, has been offset by subsequent 03Q1  03Q2  03Q3  03Q4  04Q1  04Q2  04Q3  04Q4  05Q1  05Q2  05Q3  05Q4  06Q1  06Q2  06Q3  06Q4  07Q1  07Q2  07Q3  07Q4  08Q1  08Q2  08Q3  08Q4  09Q1  09Q2  09Q3  09Q4 total banking system BLS panel of banks 03Q1  03Q2  03Q3  03Q4  04Q1  04Q2  04Q3  04Q4  05Q1  05Q2  05Q3  05Q4  06Q1  06Q2  06Q3  06Q4  07Q1  07Q2  07Q3  07Q4  08Q1  08Q2  08Q3  08Q4  09Q1  09Q2  09Q3  09Q4 total banking system BLS panel of banks Figures 1 and 2 , which report the growth rates of bank loans to enterprises and households for both the panel of banks and the overall Italian system, show that the pattern of credit dynamics for the banks in the BLS panel is similar to that for the system as a whole, although the rate of growth is lower over most of the sample period, especially in the case of enterprises and during the financial crisis.
As to the information provided by the Italian component of the BLS, Table 1 gives descriptive statistics for the indicators of supply and demand conditions for, respectively, loans to enterprises and mortgage loans to households. In the case of loans to enterprises, considering the entire period, a large majority of individual banks' responses fall in the "unchanged" category. Answers reporting that supply conditions had eased (either considerably or somewhat) are almost absent. Many responses indicate "tightened somewhat", while very few indicate "tightened considerably". Notable differences emerge when we split the sample period: during the crisis 40 per cent of the answers fall in the "tightened" category, compared with less than one fourth in the pre-crisis period. As to the demand assessments, no extreme answers were observed; the frequency of responses indicating a "decrease" doubled in the crisis period with respect to the previous one.
Considering mortgage loans to households, over the entire sample period a large majority of answers on supply conditions indicate "unchanged", while extreme answers are absent. The percentage of answers reporting a "tightening" rises considerably when we move from the pre-crisis to the crisis period (from 7 per cent to 34 per cent). Almost 40 per cent of the answers indicate a decrease in demand during the crisis, compared with a very low percentage in the pre-crisis period. 6 The survey also has sections that were not used in this study. They include questions on consumer credit and other lending to households and forward-looking questions regarding banks' expectations of the evolution of credit standards and demand conditions over the next three months. The complete questionnaire can be found on the ECB and the Bank of Italy websites. In the BLS, banks are also asked to respond to more detailed questions concerning the factors that affected their decisions on credit standards and the specific terms and conditions for approving loans, and their assessment of the determinants of the demand for loans.
Concerning the factors behind changes in credit standards, banks are asked to rate the importance of the cost of funds and balance sheet constraints, pressure from competition, and perception of risk, choosing their answers on a scale of five options (from "contributed considerably to tightening of credit standards" to "contributed considerably to easing of credit standards"). 7 Terms and conditions concern prices, quantities and other non-price conditions. Responses can be chosen among the same five options available for the general question (i.e. from "tightened considerably" to "eased considerably").
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Detailed descriptive evidence on the answers to these specific questions is reported in the Appendix (Tables A1-A6 ). The main facts, in particular concerning the crisis period, can be summarized as follows.
For loans to enterprises: i) Both in the pre-crisis and in the crisis period the most important factors determining the tightening of credit standards were the perception of credit risk (Table A1 ). The importance of factors relating to the bank's balance sheet position and ability to access finance rose during the crisis but remained less important than risk considerations.
ii) The tightening of supply conditions during the crisis took place through changes in both margins and credit availability (Table A2 ). The frequency of responses of "tightened somewhat" for both margins on average loans and margins on riskier loans rose considerably. The percentage of answers indicating a reduction in the size of loans or credit lines remained lower by comparison but showed a sharp increase.
iii) According to the banks' assessments the weakness of demand during the crisis period was mainly attributable to less need to finance fixed investment and to a lower requirement for mergers and acquisitions and corporate restructuring (Table A3 ).
For mortgage loans to households: iv) Perceptions of risk were the leading factor in the tightening; a smaller role was played by the cost of funds and balance sheet constraints (Table A4) .
v) The tightening of credit standards during the crisis period occurred mainly through increases in margins on riskier loans and reductions in the loan-to-value ratio (Table A5 ).
vi) Housing market prospects, which had contributed to higher demand during the precrisis period, provided a negative contribution during the crisis (Table A6) .
and balance sheet constraints with no further specification, pressure from competition from other banks and from non-banks, and perception of risk relating to the general economic outlook or housing market prospects. 8 More precisely, price conditions refer to the interest rate margins on, respectively, average loans and riskier loans; quantity conditions to the size of the loan or credit line; other non-price conditions to non-interest rate charges, collateral requirements, loan covenants and maturity for loans to enterprises and to collateral requirements, loan-to-value ratio, maturity and non-interest rate charges for mortgage loans to households. 03Q1  03Q2  03Q3  03Q4  04Q1  04Q2  04Q3  04Q4  05Q1  05Q2  05Q3  05Q4  06Q1  06Q2  06Q3  06Q4  07Q1  07Q2  07Q3  07Q4  08Q1  08Q2  08Q3  08Q4  09Q1  09Q2  09Q3 03Q1  03Q2  03Q3  03Q4  04Q1  04Q2  04Q3  04Q4  05Q1  05Q2  05Q3  05Q4  06Q1  06Q2  06Q3  06Q4  07Q1  07Q2  07Q3  07Q4  08Q1  08Q2  08Q3  08Q4  09Q1  09Q2  09Q3  09Q4 -100 
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A general caveat, which applies to our study, as to any other analysis based on a survey, is that the quality of the results depends on the veracity of the respondents' answers.
In the case of lending surveys, it is typically thought that banks may be inclined to report tighter credit standards than the ones they actually apply. This hypothesis originates from the empirical observation that in the Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey indications of "tightening" have historically outnumbered those of "easing"; it also reflects the consideration that banks, as regulated institutions, may have an incentive to report tighter policies than those actually implemented if they fear that the information could be exploited for supervisory purposes, especially when the survey is conducted by the supervisory authority (Schreft and Owens 1991) . By contrast, in a crisis period such as the recent one, banks can be exposed to public criticism and political pressure, being regarded as responsible for a credit crunch that hurts the economy, and thus might have an incentive to portray their policies as less restrictive than they actually are, even though the results of the survey are only published as aggregate data for the entire panel, with no disclosure of individual answers. This issue is explored further in Section 4.
Information content of BLS indicators: empirical evidence
The econometric analysis on the information content of BLS indicators is carried out on an unbalanced panel of 11 Italian banks and a sample period of 29 quarters (2002Q4-2009Q4) , by estimating regressions of the following general form:
is the quarter-on-quarter (henceforth q-o-q) rate of growth in bank lending for bank i in the quarter t, alternatively for loans to enterprises and for mortgage loans to households; 9 BLS_S i and BLS_D i indicate, respectively, the indicators of supply and demand 9 The data on loans are adjusted for the effects of securitization; this adjustment improves the economic significance of the dependent variable and is particularly important in the case of mortgage loans to households (due to the high proportion of securitized loans) and especially for the crisis period, due to the large amount of securitized loans, used as collateral in euro-area banks' refinancing operations with the Eurosystem. Seasonal patterns were taken into account by including a set of appropriate seasonal dummies in the estimated equation. This approach has been preferred to the use of more sophisticated routines owing to the relatively short time series available for some intermediaries included in the panel.
conditions obtained from the BLS for bank i;
10 X is a vector of other variables that can influence loan growth, including the interest rate on individual bank loans, the monetary policy rate and other macro variables usually included in estimated credit demand equations (nominal GDP, gross fixed capital formation and financing need in the case of loans to firms, house prices for mortgage loans to households; see respectively Casolaro et al. (2006) and Casolaro and Gambacorta (2005) ). Fixed bank effects and (when appropriate) time dummies were also included in the estimated equations.
Since the BLS indicators are qualitative variables, BLS_S i and BLS_D i are defined as two vectors of dummy variables, each of which corresponds to one of the possible alternative answers in the survey. The relationship between credit growth and the BLS indicators can thus be written as follows:
The dummies for credit supply conditions correspond to the following responses:
1="eased considerably"; 2="eased somewhat"; 3="tightened somewhat"; 4="tightened considerably". Those for credit demand conditions correspond to the following assessments:
1="decreased considerably"; 2="decreased somewhat"; 3="increased somewhat"; 4="increased considerably". For instance, BLS_S_tightsome it is a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if at time t bank i reported that its credit standards had "tightened somewhat" in the previous three months and zero otherwise. ; the effects are expected to be larger for the banks' responses falling in the extreme modalities (when replies of this kind are actually observed, which is not always the case), i.e. we would expect
. It is important to notice that the supply and demand effects estimated on the basis of these variables provide an indication of effects which are captured by the BLS indicators, over and above those captured by the other variables included in the regression. This holds in particular for the indicator of demand conditions, since credit demand may be related to common macroeconomic developments whose influence should be captured by the level of interest rates, other macro-variables and 15 the time dummies included in the regression. However, the evidence reported below indicates that the introduction of control variables does not significantly affect the estimation results for the BLS variables.
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It is worth noting that an alternative could be to include the cumulated levels of the BLS indicators, rather than the indicators themselves. As remarked in the methodological discussion in Section 6, this definition would indeed be more consistent with a literal reading of the BLS questions and answers, an important aspect that has not been addressed in previous work based on lending surveys, including recent studies on the BLS information for the euro area. However, as we show in the same section, the inclusion of the cumulated indicators provides unclear results or worsens the fit of the estimates (depending on the approach), which argues against following this alternative specification.
The results are reported in Table 2 for loans to enterprises and in Table 3 bank fixed effects and seasonal dummies were included in all specifications.
13 11 We also controlled for the possibility that loan dynamics have been significantly affected by local demand developments, not necessarily captured by the national variables. We computed Herfinhdal indices of regional concentration for the lending activity of the banks belonging to the panel in the 20 Italian regions. Since they indicated the presence of a significant degree of regional concentration for some banks, we estimated regressions including interaction terms between individual bank dummies and regional demand indicators (using industrial firms' assessments on the development of, alternatively, orders and production, both taken from the monthly business survey carried out by the Institute for Studies and Economic Analysis -ISAE). The results obtained indicated no significant change in coefficients of the BLS supply and demand indicators.
12 Specifications where the individual loan rate was replaced by the Eonia (as a variable representative of the monetary policy interest rate) or by the spread between these two rates were also estimated, with no significant change in the results. 13 Excluding the individual bank fixed effects did not provide any significant change in the results.
Results for loans to enterprises
In the case of loans to enterprises, based on the regression which only includes the BLS indicators (Table 2 , column a), both supply and demand conditions appear to have a statistically significant role. The results indicate that responses of a "tightened considerably"
by all banks in the panel would be associated (with a one quarter lag) with a reduction in the q-o-q rate of growth of loans by 2.3 percentage points (corresponding to about 9 percentage points on an annual basis) with respect to the growth rate that would have been observed in the same quarter had all banks left their credit standards unchanged. The effect of a "tightened somewhat" change in credit standards is also highly significant and only slightly smaller in magnitude. The coefficient for the "eased somewhat" dummy (no "eased considerably" response was ever recorded) is not significant. As to demand conditions, both indications of "increased somewhat" and "decreased somewhat" for demand are significantly related to credit dynamics, as they are associated with, respectively, an increase in the . 15 The estimated effects of all BLS variables decrease somewhat, but the changes are larger for the BLS demand indicator; in particular, the effect of "decreased somewhat" demand becomes non significant. Column (c) shows that even including time dummies the information content of the BLS variables remains appreciable, especially concerning supply conditions (with the "tightened somewhat" dummy still playing a significant role).
The results reported in columns (d) and (e) indicate that there are no significant changes in the estimated relationship during the crisis period. Although this suggests that there was no break in the relationship between BLS indicators and credit growth in the crisis period, this result is to be interpreted with caution, given that the analysis is based on a very small number of observations for the crisis period.
All in all, the estimated relationships between the rate of growth of loans to enterprises and the BLS variables indicate that changes in supply conditions played an important role during the sample period and that this result is robust to the introduction of control variables.
The relationship is apparently asymmetric (only "tightened" conditions enter significantly);
however, this finding needs to be interpreted carefully, given that the banks have rarely reported an easing of credit standards. Demand factors, as captured by the BLS, also played a significant role, though the way they did is less clear when control variables are introduced.
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Results for mortgage loans to households
For mortgage loans to households, considering specification (a) in Table 3 , only the dummies capturing demand conditions are significant, with the expected sign and a higher coefficient than in the case of loans to enterprises; the estimated coefficients indicate that a weakening in demand conditions reported by all banks in the panel would be associated with a reduction in the (contemporaneous) q-o-q rate of growth of loans of about 2.0 and 1.0 percentage points, respectively, for the "decreased considerably" and the "decreased somewhat" answers. BLS supply indicators are not shown to have played a significant role.
Columns (b) and (c) show that the coefficients of the BLS demand indicator become smaller and lose statistical significance once we include control variables. It is also interesting to notice that, contrary to what we observed for the case of loans to enterprises, the individual bank loan interest rate enters with a negative sign, suggesting that a demand effect prevails in its relationship with credit developments. House prices and nominal GDP growth also enter significantly with the expected sign. No change in the relationship is observed when we consider the crisis period separately (columns d and e). 16 There are no substantial changes in the results if we collapse into just two dummies both the BLS indicator of supply conditions ("tightening" and "easing") and the indicator of demand conditions ("increasing" and "decreasing"), i.e. if we disregard the difference between the "somewhat" and "considerably" modalities. The results are also similar if we use one variable for both supply and demand (each taking values from 1 to 5, corresponding to the banks' answers to the BLS questions; i.e. implicitly assuming a linear relationship between loan growth and BLS answers). creditworthiness. This analysis has significant policy implications, since both the effects of the supply tightening on credit dynamics and the appropriate policy reactions can depend on the factors driving it.
As described in Section 2, the BLS provides useful information to investigate this issue, as banks are asked not only the general question concerning changes in their credit standards, but also a further question concerning the importance of the various factors determining the changes in their supply policy, differentiating between: i) "cost of funds and balance sheet constraints" (with a further distinction between "costs related to bank's capital position", "banks' ability to access market financing" and "bank's liquidity position"); ii)
"pressure from competition"; iii) "perception of risk" (in turn relating to "expectations regarding general economic activity", "industry or firm-specific outlook", or "risk on collateral demanded").
Although all factors will be considered in our empirical analysis, the first and third groups are the most relevant. 17 Factors belonging to the first group can unambiguously be interpreted as "pure" supply (or "credit crunch") factors. The case is less clear for the third group. A more prudent attitude on the part of banks may in fact be the proper reaction to the increase in borrowers' risk of default, in which case it cannot be characterized as a "credit crunch" factor. But it may also reflect a reduction in banks' ability or willingness to assess borrowers' creditworthiness properly, or an increase in banks' risk aversion beyond what is warranted by economic developments, in which case it can indeed be considered a "credit crunch" factor.
Bearing this distinction in mind, we run a regression of the q-o-q growth rate of loans to enterprises on the three categories of factors considered in the BLS. The factors related to "cost of funds and balance sheet constraints" are considered separately, while the information concerning "perception of risk" is collapsed into just one variable, independently of whether these perceptions refer to the expectations of general economic 17 Motivations related to pressure from competition are almost never reported during periods of tightening.
21 developments, the industry or firm-specific outlook, or the risk on collateral. 18 For this variable, we distinguish between the replies "contributed considerably to a tightening" and "contributed somewhat to a tightening". This distinction was not necessary for the other factors, as they were never reported with the "considerably" qualification.
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The results, reported in Table 4 , indicate that among factors relating to the banks' balance sheet constraints, only costs related to their capital position affected loan growth significantly (with a lag of two quarters). The perception-of-risk variable appears to have played an important role mainly during the crisis (with a lag of 1 quarter) and more clearly so when it is reported to have "contributed considerably to the tightening".
These results can be considered as complementary with respect to the findings for the overall supply indicator. In this regard, it is to be noted that in the BLS there is not always a clear correspondence between the banks' answers concerning the changes in their credit standards and replies concerning the factors behind these changes. In particular, there are cases in which a bank signals no change in its own overall supply policy but reports that a specific factor has contributed to a change. This suggests that the banks' replies concerning the specific factors are not always "conditional" on their answers on their overall supply policy (although this is what the formulation of the questionnaire would imply). Notes: the dependent variable is the q-o-q growth rate of loans to enterprises. BLS specific factors are based on individual replies by the same banks. All regressors for supply conditions are included with a lag of one quarter, except for "costs related to bank's capital position" which is included with a lag of two quarters. "Perception of risk" is a dummy variable taking a value of 1 when banks indicate a change in credit standards stemming from at least one of the following factors: "expectations regarding general economic activity", "industry or firm-specific outlook", "risk on the collateral demanded". All the regressions include seasonal dummies and bank-specific fixed effects. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the level of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. ). This suggests that in this period the banks' answers on their perception of risk provided a more telling picture of the orientation of their policies than their answers on the overall tightening. It is to be noted, however, that a greater and more generalized improvement in the fit is obtained when we include the individual bank loan rate and macroeconomic indicators in the regression, corresponding to specification (e) in Table 4 ( Figure 6b ).
In the light of the evidence provided in this section, in Section 5 we use both the BLS overall indicator of supply conditions and the specific factor indicators, as well as specifications with and without control variables, to obtain more robust estimates of the importance of supply factors during the crisis.
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21 As described in Section 2, in the BLS banks also provide responses about specific terms and conditions for approving loans, specifying whether changes in supply conditions took place through the size of loans or credit lines or through pricing. We investigated the information content of these answers by replacing in our regressions the overall supply indicator with the specific indicators for the various terms and conditions. The 
The slowdown of credit during the financial crisis: supply tightening or lack in demand?
In order to assess the role played by supply and demand factors in the sharp slowdown of credit during the financial crisis, we performed a counterfactual exercise in which we compared the fitted values obtained from our estimates with those we would obtain had supply and demand conditions, as captured by the BLS, remained unchanged with respect to the pre-crisis period. This was done by using the estimated coefficients and setting the BLS results (not reported but available from the authors upon request) indicate that only changes in the size of loans or credit lines played a significant role, though only in the regressions without control variables. The fit of the equation worsens with respect to the alternative specifications (i.e. including the overall indicator of supply variables equal to their values in the second quarter of 2007, before the beginning of the financial crisis. 22 We carried out this analysis considering both the indicator of overall supply conditions and the indicators of the specific factors behind them. The former is the main piece of information provided by this type of survey and the one we can expect banks to pay the greatest attention to when formulating their answers. It is also the one used in most of the existing empirical literature based on bank lending surveys. As discussed in Section 4, the latter piece of information allows us to disentangle the supply effects attributable to cost of funds and balance sheet conditions from those related to perception of risk. In addition, it offers useful complementary evidence in particular in cases in which the signals it provides do not coincide exactly with those of the overall indicator, possibly reducing the unexplained part of credit dynamics.
The results are reported in Figure 7a for the specification based on the overall supply indicator and in Figure 7b for the specification based on the specific factor indicators. In both cases the estimated regressions includes only BLS indicators (i.e. with no control variables; specification (a) in Table 2 and (d) in Table 4 ). In order to test the robustness of our findings we carried out the same counterfactual exercise with alternative specifications including control variables (individual bank loan rate plus, alternatively, macroeconomic variables or time dummies, corresponding to specifications (b) and (c) in Table 2 and specifications (d) and (e) in Table 4 ). With respect to the regression that only includes the BLS indicators, these specifications generate a better fit at the expense of a less immediate interpretation, since it is impossible to determine whether the part of credit developments explained by the control variables should be attributed to supply or to demand effects.
As shown in Table 5 , the results are similar across specifications. Considering all of them, the contribution of supply factors to the q-o-q rate of growth of loans to enterprises in the period 2007Q2-2009Q4 can be estimated to be negative by between 2.2 and 3.1 percentage points. It should be noted that these estimates are for the panel of banks participating in the BLS, which are mainly large banks. Since the slowdown in lending to enterprises was sharper for them than for smaller banks, the question is whether this reflects some difference in the relative importance of supply factors. Evidence from the Regional Bank Lending Survey for Italy 24 suggests that this is not the case: on average, between the fourth quarter of 2008 and the end of 2009 the indicators of supply conditions for the medium-to-large banks and for small banks do not differ significantly (while a more marked worsening of demand conditions was reported by the former). On this evidence, we conclude that the estimates of the supply effects we have obtained for the BLS panel do substantially hold for the entire Italian banking system.
Robustness: empirical analysis using the cumulated BLS indicators
In this section we consider the possibility that the relationship between loan growth and BLS information may be better captured using a different empirical specification from the one used in Section 3.
Consider, for instance, the case in which the BLS supply indicator signals a tightening.
The coefficients estimated with the regressions carried out in Section 3 indicate how, on average (i.e. over the sample period and for the whole panel of banks participating in the survey), the q-o-q growth in loans is affected by a tightening in the same quarter or in a previous one, compared with the growth rate that would have been observed had the BLS indicator signalled unchanged supply conditions. These results, however, do not tell us whether this effect varies depending on whether this is a first tightening or a further tightening following one or more quarters of restriction. In other words, it does not tell us whether what matters is only what the banks report concerning the change in their credit standards in the quarter considered or also what they had reported in the previous quarters. In the latter case, a stronger relationship should hold between the rate of growth in loans and the BLS supply indicator when the cumulated level of the latter is included in the regression.
Although this issue is very important for interpretation of the information provided by this type of survey, it has received little attention in the literature. The study by Schreft and Owens (1991) is, to our knowledge, the only one that considers it explicitly, though without The interpretation of the answers on demand conditions is even more problematic: the banks are requested to indicate how the demand for loans has changed, apart from normal seasonal fluctuations, over the past three months. Given that the possible answers are expressed in terms of "increase" or "decrease", one would expect that an indicator in the "decreasing" territory is associated, ceteris paribus, to a contraction (i.e. a negative rate of growth) in credit, while an indicator in the "increasing" territory should be associated with a positive growth rate. However, even a simple descriptive examination of the relationship 30 between the BLS demand indicator and loans developments suggests that a literal reading of the banks' answers is problematic (quite often a negative BLS demand indicator is associated with a largely positive change in loans). This suggests that the banks' assessments on demand should be interpreted in terms of "acceleration" and "deceleration", rather than "increase" and "decrease". The analysis presented in this paper, based on the growth rate of loans as the dependent variable, is consistent with this interpretation.
Accordingly, we analyse how the relationship between developments in loans to enterprises and the BLS information is affected when we consider the cumulated level of the supply and demand indicators rather than the indicators themselves.
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To do this, we replace the dummies used in Section 3 with alternative dummies that capture the length of the phases of tightening/easing of credit standards, along with the phases of increase/decrease in demand conditions. For instance, the dummy for the "tightened somewhat" supply condition is replaced by the following four dummies (dummies for other supply conditions and for demand conditions are constructed similarly): The results, reported in Table 6 , do not provide evidence of a clear relationship between the persistence of changes in supply and demand conditions and the estimated impact on the rate of growth in loans. The fact that the supply "tightened somewhat" condition affects credit growth significantly only when it is observed for more than two quarters could be seen as consistent with such a relationship, but the decrease in the coefficient after more than three quarters points in the opposite direction. Moreover, a set of F-test rejects the hypothesis that the estimated coefficients differ depending on the persistence of the tightening. The results obtained above could be affected by degree-of-freedom problems, given the large number of parameters compared with the number of observations. Therefore we also addressed the same question in a more parsimonious framework, by collapsing the information into just one variable for the supply conditions and one variable for the demand 32 conditions, for both the BLS indicators and the corresponding cumulated indicators, implicitly assuming that a linear relationship holds between the various possible answers to each question. For instance, in the case of the supply indicator, the variable BLS_S takes a value of 1 to 5, corresponding to answers ranging from "eased considerably" to "tightened considerably", while the cumulated indicator is defined as follows:
The corresponding variables for the demand conditions are defined similarly.
The results are reported in Table 7 . For the regression with the cumulated indicators the estimated coefficients for both the supply and the demand BLS indicators tend to loose statistical significance when the control variables are included; the fit of the equation is worse, compared to the regression with the BLS indices, for all the specifications considered. All in all, these results indicate that there is a clear case for including the BLS indicators rather than their cumulated levels in the regression for loans to enterprises, though this implies that the interpretation of this information needs to be qualified with respect to a literal reading of the survey questions and answers. Indeed, our results suggest that banks' 33 responses may largely reflect their assessment of the distance between the degree of tightness of their own credit standards in the reference quarter and some "benchmark" condition they are likely to have in mind rather than their assessment of the actual change in the degree of tightness over the three months considered in each run of the survey.
Conclusions
In this paper we use the qualitative indicators of supply and demand conditions derived contribution of supply factors to the annualized quarter-on-quarter rate of growth in loans to enterprises by the banks in the BLS panel is estimated to be between 2.2 to 3.1 percentage points, depending on the specification. About one fourth of this effect can be attributed to costs related to banks' balance sheet position; the rest is associated with banks' perception of credit risk. Pre-crisis (02q4-07q2) 0.0 6.9 88.6 3.8 0. 
Appendix. Additional descriptive statistics

